Political alliances in Pakistan are rarely permanent. Parties that stand together against one government may find themselves on opposing sides in the next political contest, while former adversaries can become partners when their interests converge. The political journey of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) chief Maulana Fazlur Rehman offers a particularly revealing example of this pattern.
Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s political manoeuvres and knack for navigating shifting alliances have kept him relevant in Pakistan’s political arena for nearly four decades, making him a seasoned political player regardless of whether his positions find favour with his critics or allies.
For years, Fazl was widely seen as a political kingmaker whose support could make or break a government. But that perception was challenged in the last general election, when his party fell short of expectations despite his leading the movement that ousted Imran Khan’s government. The subsequent formation of a government without his support further underscored the limits of his political influence.
Yet, the latest political tensions between the federal government and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), alongside the imposition of an emergency and governor’s rule in KP, have once again brought Fazl’s political relevance into focus.
The renewed attention comes with an offer from the government’s own ranks. In an interview with HUM News’ ‘Hum Dekhen Gay’, Prime Minister’s Coordinator for Information and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Affairs Ikhtiar Wali Khan said Maulana Fazl could be considered for the provincial governorship if he wanted the position.
“If Maulana himself wants to become the governor of KP, it can be considered, while the Pakistan People’s Party would also have no objection to giving him the position,” Ikhtiar Wali said.
The offer comes as the federal government and the PTI remain at odds over the province’s political future, placing Maulana Fazl once again in the conversation around possible political realignments.
Over the course of his political career, Maulana Fazl’s party has allied with and opposed several major political forces, including the PPP, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and the PTI. Some of these partnerships have brought together groups with sharply contrasting ideological positions, while other alliances have eventually given way to intense political opposition. These shifting relationships have repeatedly placed him at the centre of political negotiations and realignments.
The question is whether these changes reflect ideological flexibility or a political strategy shaped by changing circumstances and interests. To understand Maulana Fazl’s current position, it is worth tracing his political journey and examining the alliances he has forged, abandoned or opposed at different stages of Pakistan’s political history.
At one point, the JUI-F chief led the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), a multi-party opposition alliance seeking to remove Imran Khan’s government. The movement culminated in April 2022, when a vote of no-confidence ousted Khan as prime minister.
Yet, following the 2024 general election, the JUI-F and the PTI began exploring avenues for political cooperation, despite their bitter differences during Khan’s tenure.
This shift raises a fundamental question about Fazl’s politics: how much do ideological commitments determine his party’s choices, and how much room does it leave for pragmatism to preserve its relevance and influence in a changing political landscape?
From MRD to mainstream politics
Following the death of his father, Mufti Mahmood, Maulana Fazl gradually emerged as a leading figure in the JUI, eventually establishing himself as one of Pakistan’s most prominent religious and political leaders.
In 1983, JUI joined the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), an opposition alliance formed to challenge Gen Zia-ul-Haq’s military rule. The alliance included the PPP and several other political parties. Its participation marked an important stage in JUI’s evolution, taking it beyond its traditional religious constituency and into broader coalitions seeking democratic change.
During the 1990s, Pakistan’s political landscape was dominated by successive governments led by the PPP and PML-N, followed by their dismissals and fresh elections. The JUI-F alternated between cooperating with and opposing the two parties, depending on the political circumstances.
Rather than maintaining an exclusive and permanent alignment with either major party, Fazl pursued a strategy that allowed his party to negotiate with different political forces. This flexibility helped the JUI-F remain part of the national political conversation despite its relatively limited electoral base.
Musharraf era: Religious unity and a share in power
A significant turning point came before the 2002 general election, when the JUI-F joined other religious parties to form the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA).
The alliance performed strongly in the elections, forming the government in the then North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or KP) and becoming a coalition partner in Balochistan. Its electoral success gave religious parties a greater parliamentary presence and an opportunity to exercise executive authority at the provincial level.
However, the MMA’s relationship with General Pervez Musharraf’s military-led government raised questions about the consistency of its political position.
Although the alliance criticised aspects of military rule, its parliamentary members supported the 17th Constitutional Amendment in December 2003. The amendment gave constitutional cover to key elements of Musharraf’s Legal Framework Order and restored the president’s power to dissolve the National Assembly, subject to constitutional safeguards.
The episode exposed a significant contradiction in the alliance’s politics. Religious parties that publicly challenged military rule had also helped secure parliamentary approval for constitutional changes that strengthened the president’s position.
The MMA defended its approach as political pragmatism, while critics viewed the arrangement as a compromise that weakened its opposition credentials. The alliance subsequently came under strain as its constituent parties disagreed over political strategy, participation in elections and relations with the Musharraf government.
Differences between the JUI-F and Jamaat-e-Islami, two of the alliance’s principal components, eventually contributed to its weakening.
Joining the PPP government — and then leaving it
After the 2008 general election, the JUI-F joined the PPP-led coalition government at the Centre. The arrangement brought together parties with different political traditions and ideological outlooks, demonstrating Maulana Fazl’s willingness to cooperate with a major political rival when circumstances allowed.
The partnership, however, did not last.
In December 2010, the JUI-F withdrew from the coalition after Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani dismissed its minister, Azam Khan Swati, following a dispute linked to allegations of irregularities in arrangements for Pakistani pilgrims travelling to Saudi Arabia. The party objected to the dismissal and decided to move to the opposition benches.
The episode illustrated both the possibilities and the limits of political accommodation: the JUI-F had been willing to join the government but withdrew when a dispute involving its representation in the cabinet became irreconcilable.
Another notable feature of Maulana Fazl’s political career was his tenure as chairman of the Parliamentary Kashmir Committee. He held the position from 2008 to 2018, spanning the PPP and PML-N governments and giving him a prominent role in parliamentary discussions on Kashmir.
From cooperation with PML-N to leading the PDM
Political cooperation between the JUI-F and the PML-N became particularly prominent after the 2013 general election. Although the two parties did not agree on every issue, they found common ground in parliamentary politics and, later, in opposition to Imran Khan’s government.
Following the 2018 elections, Maulana Fazl challenged the credibility of the results and demanded Khan’s resignation. In October 2019, he led an anti-government march on Islamabad, creating a major political challenge for the newly elected government.
The PPP and the PML-N also opposed Khan’s government, but the opposition parties differed over the timing, tactics and extent of their protest campaign.
In September 2020, the JUI-F, the PML-N, the PPP and several other parties joined forces to establish the PDM. Maulana Fazl was chosen to lead the alliance, which sought to increase political and parliamentary pressure on the PTI government.
The movement’s most consequential success came in April 2022, when a parliamentary vote of no-confidence removed Khan from office.
However, the alliance’s unity weakened after the change of government. Its constituent parties differed over participation in the new administration, political strategy and the future direction of the opposition movement. The PPP and the PML-N entered the post-Khan political arrangement, while the JUI-F also became part of the coalition that supported the new government.
The parties that had united to remove Khan could not sustain a common political direction once their immediate objective had been achieved. Their subsequent differences highlighted how shared opposition to a government does not necessarily translate into agreement over governance or long-term policy.
From confrontation with PTI to political engagement
The relationship between Maulana Fazl and the PTI has undergone one of the most striking shifts in his political career.
During Khan’s government, the two sides were bitter opponents. Maulana Fazl rejected the 2018 election results, led the Azadi March against the government and supported the campaign that culminated in Khan’s removal. The PTI, meanwhile, repeatedly criticised Maulana Fazl and his party, with differences extending across electoral, political and religious issues.
The 2024 general election created a new political environment. Disputes over the election results, the formation of the new government and the opposition’s parliamentary strategy opened up avenues for contact between the two parties.
Their engagement developed gradually rather than through an immediate, comprehensive alliance. The parties explored cooperation on constitutional and political matters while retaining their differences on other issues.
By September 2026, the JUI-F had agreed to participate in a multi-party conference being organised by the PTI, with the two sides discussing the possibility of a joint opposition strategy on national issues. The development represented a further step towards political coordination, although participation in a conference did not, by itself, establish a permanent electoral or parliamentary alliance.
This distinction matters. Political contact, cooperation on a specific issue and a formal alliance are different arrangements. Treating them as interchangeable would exaggerate the extent of the shift in relations between the two parties.
Nevertheless, the prospect of cooperation between former adversaries has revived a familiar question in Pakistani politics: how much weight do ideological differences carry when parties identify a shared political objective?
Opposition to governor’s rule in KP
Maulana Fazl has emerged as a vocal critic of the federal government’s decision to impose an emergency and governor’s rule in KP, rejecting the move and hinting at street protests a day after its announcement.
The JUI-F chief accused the government of backing away from an understanding reached with the PTI during negotiations, claiming that the two sides had settled all outstanding issues before the government reneged at the last moment.
Maulana Fazl stepped up his criticism on October 16 while addressing party workers at the Mufti Mahmood Conference in Multan, taking aim at both the federal government and the establishment’s role in national politics. His remarks prompted a sharp response from senior PML-N leaders, who accused him of supporting militants and alleged that his criticism was an attempt to secure a greater share of power in the federal government.
Pragmatism, ideology or political interests?
Maulana Fazl’s political history can be interpreted in several ways. His party’s decisions have reflected a combination of parliamentary calculations, coalition-building, constitutional debates, electoral strategy and opposition to rival political forces.
One perspective frames his approach as political pragmatism. By keeping communication channels open with different parties, the JUI-F has been able to participate in governments, lead opposition alliances and negotiate over legislation and national issues. This approach has helped the party maintain a place in national politics beyond what its electoral strength alone might suggest.
A second interpretation focuses on the tensions between ideological commitments and political decisions. Critics argue that when a party cooperates with political forces it has previously condemned, questions naturally arise about the consistency of its stated principles. The MMA’s support for the 17th Amendment under Musharraf and the JUI-F’s subsequent alliances with parties from contrasting political traditions are examples frequently cited in this debate.
From this perspective, the central issue is not simply whether alliances change, but whether the objectives pursued through those alliances remain consistent with a party’s stated political and ideological commitments.
There is, however, a distinction between changing political positions and abandoning ideological principles. Parties may cooperate on constitutional reforms or electoral strategy without agreeing on every policy. Similarly, joining a coalition does not necessarily mean endorsing every action taken by its partners.
The more useful question, therefore, is what a party seeks to achieve through each alliance, what concessions it makes and whether the resulting decisions can be reconciled with its public commitments.
For the JUI-F, the record suggests a preference for maintaining political options rather than committing permanently to one major party. This can provide room for negotiation and preserve influence in a fragmented political system. It can also expose the party to criticism when its latest political partners are former opponents.
The limits of political flexibility
Political flexibility can help a party remain relevant, particularly when its parliamentary strength is insufficient to shape national policy on its own. Alliances can provide access to government, opportunities to influence legislation and a platform from which to negotiate with larger parties.
But flexibility also carries risks. Repeated changes in political alignment can make it difficult for voters to distinguish between a party’s enduring principles and its immediate tactical objectives. When political compromises are not clearly explained, opponents can portray them as evidence of inconsistency or an overriding concern with power.
These questions are not unique to the JUI-F. Pakistan’s political history is full of shifting alliances, cooperation between former adversaries and disputes over the distribution of power. Governments have frequently depended on coalitions, while opposition parties have struggled to maintain unity beyond a shared demand or immediate political objective.
Maulana Fazl’s political journey is significant because it illustrates how a religious party has navigated these shifting relationships over several decades. From the MRD and the MMA to coalitions with the PPP and PML-N, leadership of the PDM and renewed engagement with the PTI, his party has repeatedly adapted to changing political circumstances.
Whether this adaptability should be understood primarily as political pragmatism, ideological flexibility or the pursuit of party interests remains open to interpretation. The answer lies not simply in whom the JUI-F allies with, but in the terms of those partnerships, the policies it advances and the compromises it accepts.
In a political system where alliances are rarely permanent, Maulana Fazl’s career offers a case study in both the uses and the limits of political flexibility. His ability to engage with former adversaries has helped keep him in the political conversation, but continued relevance is not, in itself, proof of ideological consistency. Ultimately, the measure of his political legacy will depend not only on how successfully he navigates shifting alliances, but also on what those alliances deliver and how closely their outcomes align with the principles his party professes.
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